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1 Introduction
In numerous social and economic situations, individuals engage in pre-play communication
to achieve coordination explicitly. Debating which restaurant to dine in, sharing informa-
tion about the relative merits of competing compatibility standards for a new product and
exchanging views about alternative public good projects or politicians in a local community
all capture such e¤orts to resolve uncertainty inherent in coordination problems.
Despite the prevailing use of pre-play communication, however, our understanding of
how its structure a¤ects behaviors and outcomes remains incomplete. There is ample
evidence that social networks play an important role in the formation of beliefs and opinions
that shape individual choices (e.g. Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008)). Workers rely on the
existing communication protocol within a rm and its structure is often crucial for the
determination of coordination outcomes for the rm (e.g. Chandler (1962) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1992)). This paper investigates experimentally how the network structure of
pre-play communication inuences individualscommunication and coordination behaviors
and, hence, the e¤ectiveness of pre-play communication on coordination.
When networks play a central role in these settings, it is natural to question not only
whether communication improves the chance of coordination but also how the benets of
coordination are distributed among individuals. In a given network, some individuals may
occupy locations that enable them to derive greater strategic inuence and payo¤s than
others.1 We therefore explore both issues of e¢ ciency and equity in the context of pre-play
communication and coordination. Specically, we consider as our underlying game a four-
player extension of Battle of the Sexes with conicting preferences about how to coordinate.
Prior to playing the underlying game, the four players engage in multiple rounds, denoted
by T , of structured pre-play communication in which they announce non-binding, hence
cheap talk, messages about their intended actions in the underlying game.
While the standard analysis of cheap talk has mainly been concerned with the role of
extra communication opportunities in achieving e¢ ciency (e.g. Farrell (1987) and Rabin
(1994)),2 the key variable in our setup concerns the extent to which each player observes
the past history of playersannouncements, which we interpret as the network structure
of pre-play communication. Specically, at the beginning of each round of communication
and the underlying game, a player observes past messages of another player if and only if
there is an undirected edge between the two players. Four networks or undirected graphs
are considered in our four-player setup, as illustrated by Figure 1 below. Nodes in each
network, denoted by N , E, S and W , represent players.
- Figure 1 about here -
1For a related discussion on network structure and individual strategic advantage, see Jackson (2008).
2Also, see Aumann and Hart (2003) and Crawford (2007).
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In the complete network, each player can communicate with every other player. In
the star network, one central player (player E) can communicate with every other player
while each of the other three players can communicate only with the central player. In the
kite network, three players (players N; E and S) can communicate with each other, while
the remaining player (player W ) can communicate only with one of the rst three players
(player E). In the line network, two players (players E and W ) can communicate with
two other players and each of the two remaining players can communicate only with one
of the rst two players. The last three networks are sometimes referred to as incomplete
networks.
Each network structure facilitates its own distinctive communication ows. Although
there exist other four-player networks, the four networks we consider provide a rich enough
ground to study the role of network structure of pre-play communication. Since we are
interested in the issue of equity as well as e¢ ciency, a particular attention will be given to
the behavior of hub players in each of the three incomplete networks: E in the star and
kite networks, E and W in the line network. These players occupy strategically inuential
locations in that some players rely entirely on their announcements to learn about others
intentions.
The games that we study allow a very rich set of histories and strategies, thereby
admitting a large number of equilibria. Thus the theory does not provide strong predictions
about which outcomes are likely to be observed in the experimental data. However, the
network structure of pre-play communication assigns particular roles to players which may
guide their behavior. To further this intuition, we focus on certain classes of equilibria
in which the asymmetry in playersnode characteristics translates into payo¤ asymmetry.
In particular, we note that the complete symmetry of players in the underlying game can
be broken by the network structure itself, and not by randomization, in the star and kite
networks but not in the line network.3 Also, the equilibrium analysis claries the sources
of multiple equilibria in our setup; for instance, unlike in the two-player game studied by
Farrell (1987) an agreementto coordinate on a particular action in the underlying game
can take a variety of forms in our setup. These insights enable us to navigate a rich data
set with the lens of theory.
In the experimental design, we consider treatments that combine the four networks and
two di¤erent lengths of pre-play communication, T = 2 and T = 5. In addition, we consider
the underlying game without communication. By varying both the network structure and
3In the star or kite network, one can construct a symmetric sequential equilibrium in which players with
identical node characteristics play the same strategy (with respect to our labels) and the hubs favorite
outcome occurs with probability 1. One such equilibrium is that the hub insists his favorite message/action
throughout the entire game with the others gradually converging to coordinate accordingly. In the line
network, however, symmetry requires randomization in the communication stage. Symmetry is a natural
equilibrium restriction in our network setup.
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length of communication, we examine how the network and time structure interact to
determine subjectscommunication behavior and inuence coordination outcomes in terms
of both e¢ ciency and equity.
Our experimental results rst establish a signicant network e¤ect on both e¢ ciency
and equity of the coordination outcome: both when T = 2 and when T = 5, signicant
di¤erences in the coordination rate and the distribution of coordinated outcomes are ob-
served across networks. However, the results also show that extra communication not only
improves the chance of coordination but also reduces asymmetry in the distribution of
coordinated outcomes. The details of these results are as follows:
 E¢ ciency: Both when T = 2 and T = 5, there is no signicant di¤erence in
coordination rates between the complete, star and kite networks while coordination
rate in the line network is signicantly lower. In all networks, coordination rate is
higher when T = 5 than when T = 2 but the increase is statistically signicant only
in the line network.
 Equity: Both when T = 2 and T = 5, coordination occurs most frequently in the
hubs favorite outcome in the star and kite networks while coordinated outcomes
appear to be uniformly distributed in the complete and line networks. Under each
time treatment, the frequency of coordination on the hubs favorite outcome is greater
in star than in kite; given star or kite, this frequency is lower when T = 5 than when
T = 2.
We next examine the experimental data from pre-play communication. In all treat-
ments, the subjectsannouncements tend to converge but less than unanimity is usually
su¢ cient to ensure corresponding coordination.
 Communication dynamics: In all treatments with pre-play communication, coor-
dination rate is mostly explained by the frequency of convergence to super-majority
or unanimity in the communication stage.
Finally, we look for regularities in the subjectsbehavior that may explain the obser-
vations on the distribution of coordinated outcomes. Interestingly, our data reveal that
the drop in the frequency of coordination on the hubs favorite outcome as we increase T
appears to be induced by di¤erent behaviors across the star and kite networks. Also, we
identify distinct behavior of players N and S in the kite network as responsible for the
smaller asymmetry in the distribution of coordinated outcomes in the kite network. Here,
we pay particular attention to nding evidence of non-switchingbehavior by the hub(s)
in which this player insists his favorite message/action throughout the entire game.
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 Behavior:
- In the star network, the hub is highly likely to display non-switching behavior both
when T = 2 and when T = 5. But, conditional on such behavior, the frequency of his
favorite message/action is lower when T = 5 than when T = 2. In the kite network,
the hub displays a strong tendency of non-switching only when T = 2.
- Players N and S in the kite network conform less to the hub than other players in
both star and kite networks.
- There is evidence that all four players behave symmetrically in the complete and
line networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Section 3 describes our setup and presents some theoretical observations that
guide our experimental design and data analysis. Section 4 outlines the research questions
to be addressed with the experimental data. Section 5 describes the experimental design
and procedures. Section 6 collects the experimental results, followed by some concluding
remarks in Section 7.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes, above all, to the experimental literature on pre-play communication
via cheap talk (see Crawford (1998) and Camerer (2003) for related surveys). Amost closely
related paper is Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1989) who consider the two-player
Battle of the Sexes with cheap talk. They study two di¤erent communication structures:
one-way communication versus two-way communication. In the former treatment only one
player can send a message to the other player, whereas the two players send messages
simultaneously to each other in the latter. They nd that coordination rates are much
higher in the one-way treatment than in the two-way treatment and also that the sender
in the one-way treatment sends his favorite message, thereby inducing coordination on his
favorite outcome, with a very large frequency. The two communication structures here can
be interpreted as two possible (directed) networks with two players.4 In contrast to their
two-player setup, our multi-player setup enables us to consider a richer variety of networks.
Also, their setup does not take account of how network e¤ect may interact with the length
of communication.
Pre-play communication in social networks has been studied elsewhere in theoretical
models of Chwe (2000), Calvó-Armengol and de Martí (2007, 2009) and Galeotti, Ghiglino
4Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1992) and Burton, Loomes and Sefton (2005) also compare the
two di¤erent communication structures in other coordination games.
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and Squintani (2009), among others. In their setups, prior to playing the underlying game
players simultaneously send messages about their private information to others whom they
are linked with (possibly in a directed way). Chwe (2000) and Calvó-Armengol and de
Martí (2007, 2009) consider coordination games with common interest and show that
coordination can be achieved in networks with fewer links than the complete network. In
a setup that allows for conicting preferences, Galeotti, Ghiglino and Squintani (2009)
examine how players incentives to report the truth and their welfare are related to the
network structure.5 Thus, the central issue in these papers is the role of network structure
on e¢ ciency. In contrast, our paper deals with the distributional issue as well as e¢ ciency.
Moreover, unlike theirs, our setup allows for multiple rounds of communication, thereby
shedding light on the e¤ects of the dynamics of communication on e¢ ciency and equity.
There is a large literature in sociology concerned with the impact of communication
networks on group outcomes (see, for example, Wasserman and Faust (1994)). By focusing
on the structural properties of networks, this literature proposes a number of indices that
capture the relative importance of di¤erent nodes within a network and the network as a
whole. One such notion that may be closely related to our analysis is that of betweenness
centrality (Freeman (1977)).6 A player, or a node, in a network is said to be between a
pair of other nodes if the node falls between the pair of other nodes on the shortest path
connecting them. A node located between other nodes controls the othersbeliefs about
what they cannot directly observe and, in this sense, a higher degree of betweenness makes
the node more important.7 Measures such as betweenness centrality, however, usually lack
behavioral foundations based on individual incentives and, therefore, how they could be
used for interpreting experimental data is not a straightforward issue.
Finally, our paper is related to a growing literature of network experiments in eco-
nomics (see, for example, Kosfeld (2004) for a survey). Among them, Choi, Gale, Kariv
and Palfrey (2009) also study experimentally the role of network structure on coordina-
tion.8 They consider a class of monotone games that can be interpreted as dynamic public
good games and use networks to describe a variety of information structures about the
history of past contributions. Their ndings suggest that network structure makes partic-
ular strategies salient, and this serves to reduce strategic uncertainty and hence facilitate
e¢ cient coordination.
5Hagenback and Koessler (2009) consider the issue of endogenous network formation in a coordination
setup with pre-play communication.
6For other notions of centrality, see Chapter 5 of Wasserman and Faust (1994).
7This node centrality measure can be used to dene centrality of a network. In our setup, the star
network is most central, followed by kite, line and complete.
8Experimental studies on the relationship between network structure and coordination have also been
conducted in other disciplines. See, for example, Kearns, Judd, Tan and Wortman (2009).
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3 The Setup
3.1 The game
We study games in which multiple players share a common interest to coordinate but each
player has his own preferred outcome. The following describes the underlying game. There
are four players, indexed by I = N;E; S;W , and each player simultaneously and inde-
pendently chooses an action, aI , from a common set fn; e; s; wg. Let a = (aN ; aE; aS; aW )
denote an action prole. A player obtains a positive payo¤ if all players choose a single
common action. Otherwise, a player receives nothing. Each player has his preferred action
corresponding to his label : player I obtains a higher payo¤ if all players choose action i.
Player Is payo¤, uI (a), is given by
uI (a) =
8<:
0
k1
k2
if
if
if
aI 6= aJ for some J 6= I
aI = aJ 6= i for all J 6= I
aI = aJ = i for all J 6= I;
where k2 > k1 > 0. If there are only two players, the game corresponds to the well-known
Battle of the Sexes. In this sense, the underlying game can be interpreted as a four-player
version of Battle of the Sexes.
Prior to playing the underlying game, the players engage in nite periods of pre-play
communication, sometimes referred to as the communication stage. Pre-play communica-
tion is cheap talk in the usual sense that it is non-binding and payo¤-irrelevant. Let T
denote the number of periods in the communication stage. In each period t = 1; 2; :::; T ,
each player I simultaneously and independently chooses a message, denoted by mtI , from
the set fn; e; s; wg. A message therefore can be interpreted as the players intended ac-
tion. We shall sometimes refer to T + 1 as the period in which the players engage in the
underlying game.
To complete the description of pre-play communication, we specify information available
to each player at the beginning of each communication period. This is represented by an
undirected graph, or network. We say that player I can communicate with player J if and
only if there is an undirected edge or link between the two players, I and J . If player I can
communicate with player J then, at the beginning of period t+ 1, each of the two players
knows the history of messages chosen by the other player up to, and including, period t.
The network structure is common knowledge. As illustrated in Figure 1, we consider four
networks: complete, star, kite and line.
The main objective of our analysis is to gain understanding of how network structure
a¤ects outcome and behavior. For this purpose, it will be helpful to identify some key
positions in the incomplete networks. A periphery is a player who has only one link: N;S
and W in the star network, W in the kite network, and N and S in the line network. A
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hub is a player who is linked to at least one periphery: E in the star network, E in the
kite network, and E and W in the line network. We shall sometimes refer to the entire
game that includes both the T -period communication stage with a given network and the
subsequent underlying game simply as the game with the particular network.
3.2 Theoretical background
Our four-player games allow a very rich set of histories and strategies, thus admitting a
large number of equilibria. Despite the multiplicity problem, however, theory points to
some useful clues as to how one should analyze experimental data. In this section, we
identify several such guidelines that will enable us to approach the data with the lens of
theory.
Since we are interested in the impact of network structure on behavior and outcome,
it is natural to adopt the notion of symmetry in equilibrium. In a given game with pre-
play communication, we can identify players that occupy symmetric locations/nodes in the
sense that, with appropriate re-labelling of the messages/actions, they are endowed with
the same strategy set and any pair of such players exchanging their strategies exchange
their payo¤s as well. In the complete network game, all four players are symmetric; in the
star network, each of the three peripheries, N , W and S, can only communicate with E
and, hence, their strategies are identical mappings (from histories to messages/actions); in
kite, N and S are similarly symmetric; and nally, line network is symmetric across the
middle and has two pairs of symmetric players: E andW , and N and S. We shall consider
symmetric (subgame perfect or sequential) equilibria in which players with identical node
characteristics adopt symmetric strategies (relative to our labels).
Before we overview the issue of multiple equilibria in the games with pre-play commu-
nication, we rst note that symmetry does not o¤er a unique prediction in our underlying
game. To see this, it is easy to nd a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which
each player plays his favorite action with probability k2
3k1+k2
and each of the other three
actions with equal probability k1
3k1+k2
. But, unlike the two-player game, there also exists a
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in which each player plays his favorite action and
thus coordination is not reached.9
In the games with pre-play communication multiple (symmetric) equilibria arise through
a variety of patterns in the communication stage. Players randomize their messages in or-
der to reach an agreementwhich will then induce the corresponding pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the underlying game. With four players, however, an agreement can take a
variety of forms. For instance, symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria can be constructed such
9Note however that the probability of coordination in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is
negligible.
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that not only unanimous announcement of a common message but also a super-majority
outcome (i.e. all but one player choose the same message) or a majority outcome (i.e.
only two players choose the same message) constitutes an agreement to achieve coordina-
tion. Another source of multiplicity of symmetric equilibria in our four-player games is
the possibility of partial agreements. That is, the players may treat certain communica-
tion outcomes as an interim basis for further negotiation. A partial agreement could, for
instance, narrow down the set of randomized messages in the continuation play, thereby
increasing the likelihood of improved agreements and later coordination. In Appendix I, we
provide detailed examples of multiple equilibria along these lines for the case of complete
network. The equilibrium features that we address here are also present in games with
other networks.10
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in the role of network structure on e¢ ciency and
equity of the coordination outcomes. For a given network, the likelihood of coordination
depends, for instance, on the denition of agreement: a more strict form of agreement is
indeed associated with a lower coordination rate in equilibrium (see Appendix I). Thus,
the multiplicity problem makes it impossible to draw any conclusion about how network
structure will a¤ect e¢ ciency.
We next discuss what game theory can tell us about the role of network structure on
the issue of equity. In particular, we consider the set of symmetric equilibria in games with
incomplete networks in which the hub acquires a higher benet than the other players.
This is because of the intuition that by strategically controlling the ow of information
players with greater access to past play of a game may derive a greater payo¤ than those
who observe less.
Our rst observation shows that, in the star and kite networks, the complete symmetry
of players in the underlying game can be broken by the network structure of pre-play
communication.
Observation 1 In the game with star or kite network, there exists a symmetric equilibrium
in which coordination on action e occurs with probability 1. In the game with line network,
there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium in which coordination on a particular action
occurs with probability 1.
The reasoning behind the statement is straightforward. In the star or kite network, for
example, every player always playing message/action e can be supported as a symmetric
sequential equilibrium. Player Es insistence on message e is met with the belief by each
periphery that the others have also chosen the same message and will play action e in the
underlying game; observation of any other messages by E triggers the (o¤-the-equilibrium)
10In the two-player game considered by Farrell (1987), these issues do not arise, and the restriction of
symmetry delivers a unique equilibrium characterization.
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belief that some other player has deviated, leading to coordination failure. Such an equilib-
rium is indeed symmetric across the peripheries. In the game with line network, however,
symmetry cannot yield sure coordination on a particular outcome since that will require
asymmetric behavior from one of the two pairs of symmetric players, E and W or N and
S.
The above observation provides a sense in which the star and kite network structures
serve the role of symmetry breaking such that disproportionate payo¤s are conferred on
the most central player, the hub. In contrast, in the line network, randomization is needed
to break the symmetry across the two pairs of players. Our next observation demonstrates
that, in all three networks, there exist alternative equilibrium dynamics, involving random-
ization, which generate outcome paths that confer asymmetric benets on the hub(s).
Observation 2 Consider the game with star, kite or line network. If T  3, there exists
a symmetric equilibrium with the following properties:
1. Coordination on each action occurs with positive probability.
2. Coordination on each hubs favorite action is most likely to occur.
The details of the equilibria are provided in Appendix I. Let us briey sketch the
construction for the star network with T = 3. In period t = 1, each periphery randomizes
among the entire message set; the hub, E, announces arbitrarily. In the next two periods,
the peripheries play arbitrary messages while the hub reports a single message twice if there
was a unanimous agreement among the peripheries on that message in t = 1 and any two
di¤erent messages otherwise. Upon observing the same message from the hub in the last
two periods of the communication stage, the players coordinate on the corresponding action
in the underlying game; otherwise, they play their own favorite actions with probability 1.
As shown in Appendix I, the above behavior constitutes a sequential equilibrium with
an appropriate o¤-the-equilibrium punishment scheme. Furthermore, the calculation of
mixing probabilities in t = 1 reveals that, in equilibrium, coordination on the hubs favorite
action, e, occurs more frequently than each of the other actions. It is important to note
that, in this equilibrium, while each periphery announces his intended action the hub
merely serves the role of information transmission; that is, his messages indicate di¤erent
message proles of only the other players that he is linked to.
Observations 1 and 2 o¤er further useful guidelines for our experimental design and
analysis in the face of multiple equilibria. We are particularly interested in the question of
whether the hub will enjoy disproportionate benets due to his informational advantage. In
the star and kite networks, such asymmetry in outcome can arise from several equilibrium
dynamics. In the equilibria of Observation 2, the hub performs the role of information
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transmission, which is distinct from the behavior in the equilibria of Observation 1. In the
line network, only randomization can induce similar asymmetric outcomes.11
4 Research Questions
We now list the set of questions that the previous theoretical discussion motivates in our
experimental study. Our research questions are four-fold. The rst two questions are
concerned with the overall impact of the treatments (time and network e¤ects) on the
nal outcome of the underlying coordination game along two central issues: e¢ ciency and
equity. The standard equilibrium analysis suggests that, for a given network, greater op-
portunities to communicate will improve the chance of coordination and hence payo¤s but
the multiplicity of equilibria makes it unclear if and how payo¤s will depend on the network
structure, or indeed what the combined e¤ect of the length and network structure of com-
munication will be. On the other hand, in an incomplete network, a hub player has more
links than others and, therefore, we are interested in whether such informational advantage
translates into asymmetric outcomes and, if so, whether the length of communication plays
any role.
Question 1 (E¢ ciency) How is the likelihood of coordination a¤ected by the length and
network structure of pre-play communication?
Question 2 (Equity) How is the distribution of coordinated outcomes a¤ected by the
length and network structure of pre-play communication?
We observed in the previous section that the problem of multiple equilibria is caused
primarily by di¤erent communication dynamics that are possible in equilibrium. This poses
a challenge in interpreting the experimental data for the communication stage. Despite
this, we want to nd whether there are, on average, any regular patterns in the observed
communication dynamics and how communication relates to coordination outcome. This
motivates our next research question.
11There is an alternative equilibrium which confers larger payo¤s to E and W in the line network. The
two players randomize among just the two messages e and w such that an agreement results in their playing
the corresponding pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the underlying game. N and S simply play the action
corresponding to their hubsmessages in period T in the underlying game. Furthermore, randomization
can also lead to symmetric outcomes/payo¤s in all three networks. For example, let T = 2, and consider
strategies with the following properties. All four players mix among the entire message set in t = 1
and the hub maintains/switches his message in t = 2 if there was an agreement/disagreement in t = 1.
Non-switching leads to coordination and switching leads to coordination failure.
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Question 3 (Communication dynamics) How is the pattern of pre-play communica-
tion a¤ected by the length and network structure of pre-play communication? What is the
relationship between the dynamics of communication and the coordination outcome in each
game?
Our nal question concerns the behavior of players at di¤erent locations within each
network. The theoretical discussion in the previous section suggests that (i) subjects at
di¤erent locations in a given network may serve distinct roles in communication and hence
determination of the coordination outcome and, moreover, (ii) such behavioral patterns
may depend on the treatment (i.e. network and time structures of communication) itself.
Thus, we are interested in identifying any regular patterns in subjectsbehavior and linking
them to outcomes in communication and coordination.
Question 4 (Behavior) Are there any regular and distinct patterns in subjectsbehavior
across treatments?
5 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was run at the Experimental Laboratory of the Centre for Economic Learn-
ing and Social Evolution (ELSE) at University College London (UCL) between May 2008
and November 2008. The subjects in the experiment were recruited from an ELSE pool
of UCL undergraduate students across all disciplines. Each subject participated in only
one of the experimental sessions. After subjects read the instructions, the instructions
were read aloud by an experimental administrator. Throughout the experiment we en-
sured anonymity and e¤ective isolation of subjects in order to minimize any interpersonal
inuences that could stimulate cooperation. Each experimental session lasted between one
hour and one and a half hours. The experiment was computerized and conducted using
the experimental software z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007). Sample instructions
are reported in Appendix II.
We studied the game with four network structures (complete, star, kite and line net-
works) and two lengths of pre-play communication (T = 2 (short) and T = 5 (long)),
in addition to the one-shot game with no communication (T = 0). A single treatment
consisting of a pair of network and T was used for each session and each treatment was
used for one session. Thus, there were in total 9 experimental sessions. Either 16 or 20
subjects participated in each session which consisted of 20 independent rounds, except
for the no-communication treatment which consisted of 30 rounds. In each session, the
network positions were labeled N;E; S; or W . One fourth of the subjects were randomly
designated as type-N participants, one fourth as type-E participants, one fourth as type-S
participants and one fourth as type-W participants. Each subjects type remained constant
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throughout the session. In each round, the subjects were randomly formed into four-person
groups. The groups formed in each round were independent of the groups formed in any
of the other rounds.
The table below summarizes the experimental design and the number of observations
in each treatment. The rst number in each cell is the number of subjects and the second
is the number of observations per treatment/session.
Network
Communication length Complete Star Kite Line
Short (T = 2) 16 / 80 16 / 80 16 / 80 16 / 80
Long (T = 5) 20 / 100 16 / 80 20 / 100 16 / 80
No (T = 0) 20 / 150
Each round was divided into two stages: a communication stage, which consists of T
(either 2 or 5) decision-turns, and an action stage, which consists of a single decision-turn.
In the no-communication treatment, there was only an action stage in each round. In the
action stage, four actions were available: n, e, s and w. The communication stage that
preceded the action stage involved each participant sending messages. In each decision-
turn of the communication stage each participant was asked to choose a message from n,
e, s and w, which were labeled by the same letters as the actions available in the action
stage. It was illustrated that a message may indicate a subjects intended action in the
subsequent action stage but the subject does not have to follow that message when it
comes to making an action choice. When every participant in the group had made his or
her decision, each participant received the messages chosen by the participants to whom
he or she was connected in the network. This completed the rst decision-turn of the
communication stage. This process was repeated in the remaining decision-turns of the
communication stage.
When the communication stage ended, each participant was asked to choose an action
out of the four possible actions without knowing the actions selected by other participants.
After every participant made a decision in the action stage, the computer informed subjects
of the actions chosen by all the participants in the group and their earnings. It was
illustrated and emphasized that the earnings in each round are determined only by the
actions chosen in the action stage and the messages chosen in the preceding communication
stage are entirely irrelevant to earnings. After each subject observed the results of the
rst round, the second round started with the computer randomly forming new groups of
four participants with distinct types. This process was repeated until all 20 rounds were
completed.
Earnings were calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged into British pounds,
where each token was worth $0:50. The earnings in each round were determined as follows.
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If all participants in the group chose a common action, a participant whose label corre-
sponded to the letter of the common action received 3 tokens while the other participants
received 1 token each. Otherwise, all participants received zero token. Thus, the total
payment to a subject was equal to $0:50 times the total number of tokens earned over
20 rounds (30 rounds in the one-shot game treatment), plus a $5 participation fee. The
average payment was about $13. Subjects received their payments privately at the end of
the session.
6 Experimental Results
6.1 Coordination outcomes
We begin our analysis of the experimental data by examining the nal outcomes of coordi-
nation in each treatment. As summarized in Section 4, the focus of our interest lies in the
impact of our treatments on both e¢ ciency and equity of nal coordination outcomes. To
address the issue of e¢ ciency, we consider the rate of coordination; for equity, we examine
the distribution of coordinated actions.
Table 1 below reports coordination rates across treatments (the top panel) and results
of the chi-square nonparametric test that compare coordination rates between each pair of
treatments (the bottom panel).
- Table 1 about here -
We rst check whether communication is indeed e¤ective. The coordination rate in
the treatment without communication is 0:05, while the coordination rates in treatments
with communication vary from 0:28 to 0:73. The di¤erence between the no-communication
treatment and each communication treatment is highly signicant (p-value in each compar-
ison is far below 0:001). Thus, we can conclude that communication is an e¤ective means
of achieving coordination.
Next, we compare coordination rates across networks for a given length of the commu-
nication stage T . When T = 2, coordination rates in the rst three networks range from
0:56 to 0:65, while coordination rate in the line network is 0:28. When T = 5, coordination
is achieved in the complete, star and kite networks with similar frequencies ranging from
0:68 to 0:73, while coordination rate in the line network is 0:50. The nonparametric tests
(lighter-shaded cells) reveal no signicant di¤erences in coordination rate among the com-
plete, star and kite networks both when T = 2 and when T = 5. However, coordination
rate in the line network is signicantly lower than in the other three networks both when
T = 2 and when T = 5.
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We also check if a longer communication stage increases the likelihood of coordination
within a network. A rst glance at the top panel of Table 1 suggests that this is indeed
the case for every network; the increases in coordination rate from T = 2 to T = 5 are
0:05 (complete), 0:09 (star), 0:12 (kite) and 0:22 (line). However, results of the pair-wise
nonparametric test in the bottom panel (darker-shaded cells) show that these di¤erences
are in fact not statistically signicant with the usual signicance levels in the complete, star
and kite networks. This suggests that the value of communication is mostly realized by two
rounds of communication in the three networks. In contrast, the likelihood of coordination
increases signicantly in the line network from T = 2 to T = 5.
These ndings are summarized below.
Result 1 (E¢ ciency) 1. Coordination rates are higher in treatments with communi-
cation than in the treatment with no communication.
2. Given any time treatment T , coordination rates are not statistically di¤erent across
the complete, star and kite networks, while coordination rate in the line network is
signicantly lower than in the other three networks.
3. Given any network treatment, coordination rate increases from T = 2 to T = 5,
although the di¤erences are not statistically signicant in the complete, star and kite
networks.
Our next Table summarizes the distribution of coordinated outcomes in the underlying
game along with the number of corresponding observations. The number in parentheses
in the last column presents a p-value from the chi-square nonparametric test for uniform
distribution.
- Table 2 about here -
There are considerable variations in the frequency of each coordinated outcome, n, e, s
or w, across treatments. In order to further clarify our results, we present the observations
across networks for each T in Figures 2A and 2B.
- Figure 2A and 2B about here -
In Table 2 and Figures 2A-B, we observe a notable e¤ect of network structure on
the distribution of coordinated outcomes. First, both when T = 2 and when T = 5, if
coordination were to occur in the star and kite networks, it would most likely to fall on
action e, the hubs favorite action, while the distribution of coordination actions is not
statistically di¤erent from the uniform distribution in the complete and line networks.
Given our intuitions and the equilibrium analysis of Section 3.2 above (Observations 1-2),
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it is indeed interesting to conrm the strategic advantage of the hub in the star and kite
networks; furthermore, just as the theory suggests, the outcomes in the complete network
turn out to be symmetric. Also interesting, in light of Observation 2, is that the two hubs,
E and W , in the line network do not actually obtain greater benets.
Second, both when T = 2 and when T = 5, the likelihood of coordination on action e
is higher in the star network than in the kite network. This appears to suggest that an
additional link between N and S in the kite network compared to the star network reduces
the hub player Es strategic advantage. We shall further investigate this issue in Section
6.3 below.
Third, there is a strong evidence of time e¤ect in the star and kite networks. Here,
the longer the players engage in cheap talk, the less frequently is that they coordinate on
action e. Furthermore, in the star network, the likelihood of coordination on each of the
other three actions appears to increase by equal proportion as we go from T = 2 to T = 5;
in the kite network, on the other hand, the decrease in the likelihood of coordination on the
hub Es favorite action is matched mainly by an increase in the likelihood of the periphery
Ws favorite action.
In summary the data support the following results.
Result 2 (Equity) 1. Both when T = 2 and when T = 5, the distribution of co-
ordinated actions is highly concentrated on action e in the star and kite networks,
whereas the distribution does not di¤er statistically from the uniform distribution in
the complete and line networks.
2. Given any T , the frequency of coordination on action e is higher in the star network
than in the kite network; given star or kite, this frequency is lower when T = 5 than
when T = 2.
Despite the multiplicity of equilibria, our experimental results strongly support regu-
larity of certain patterns in outcomes. The network structure of communication indeed
matters for both e¢ ciency and equity of coordination outcomes. However, the length of
communication also plays an important role. Our results suggest that allowing the players
to communicate longer will not only improve e¢ ciency but also make the coordination
outcome more equitable in the networks that produce asymmetric coordination outcomes.
6.2 Communication and coordination
We next examine the play of the communication stage and relate the dynamics of commu-
nication to coordination outcomes. First, we consider the form of agreementthat leads
to coordination. Table 3 presents the likelihood of coordination (on any action) in the
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underlying game contingent on each possible outcome in the last period of the communi-
cation stage, together with the number of observations for each communication outcome.
In the complete network, communication outcomes are divided into ve categories: una-
nimity, super-majority, majority, tied-majority and complete disagreement. Unanimity is
an outcome in which all four players announce the same message; super-majority is an
outcome in which all but one player choose the same message; majority is an outcome in
which only two players announce the same message; tied-majority is an outcome with two
distinct pairs of two players who choose the same message; and complete disagreement is an
outcome in which each player announces a distinct message. In the incomplete (star, kite
and line) networks, we divide super-majority and majority further by identifying whether
such an outcome includes the hub player(s). For example, a super-majority outcome NES
in the star network represents players N , E, and S choosing the same message in period
T .12
- Table 3 about here -
There is a strong relation between what happens in the last period of the communication
stage and coordination across all treatments: a wider consensus improves the chance of
coordination. Unanimity leads to coordination almost with certainty in all treatments.
Super-majority (including the hub(s) in the incomplete networks) is very likely to induce
coordination in most of the treatments, one possible exception being the line network with
T = 2 where the coordination rate contingent on super-majority in period T is 0:35.13
On the other hand, we observe high frequencies of unanimity and super-majority in
the last period of communication, especially in the complete, star and kite networks. For
instance, in the complete network, the subjects reach super-majority or unanimity by
period T in 69% of observations when T = 2 and 88% of observations when T = 5.
This therefore leads us to our next Table, which reports the frequency of unanimity or
super-majority occurring in each period t  T .
- Table 4 about here -
There is a clear pattern of convergence towards agreement, i.e. unanimity or super-
majority, in all treatments. The chance of an agreement in the rst period is low, ranging
from 0:04 (line network with T = 5) and 0:29 (star network with T = 2), but it increases
monotonically over time in all treatments. Moreover, in all treatments, the chance of
eventual coordination (the last column) is mostly explained by the chance of successfully
12Due to small number of observations, tied-majority and complete disagreement are treated as one
outcome in each of the incomplete networks.
13Notice also that, in each of the incomplete networks, almost all super-majority outcomes in period T
include the hub(s).
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reaching such an agreement. This implies that the role of network structure in determining
e¢ ciency of outcome indeed depends on how well it facilitates the ow of information and
hence the formation of agreement among the players.
Another interesting observation is related to the role of extra communication. Notice
rst that the marginal increase in the proportion of agreement across two periods (the
number in parentheses) is larger when T = 2 than when T = 5 in each network. More
interestingly, the improvement in coordination rate as we go from T = 2 to T = 5 is larger
in the networks that are less e¤ective in inducing agreement.
We summarize these results below.
Result 3 1. In all treatments, the coordination rate is mostly explained by the frequency
of convergence to super-majority or unanimity in the communication stage.
2. The increase in coordination rate from T = 2 to T = 5 is greater in a network with
lower frequency of convergence.
6.3 Behavior in the star and kite networks
The distributions of coordinated outcomes in the star and kite networks turn out to be
highly asymmetric in favor of the hub, player E, but extra communication reduces such
asymmetry. Also, given T , the degree of inequity is greater in the star than in the kite
network. In order to identify any behavioral patterns responsible for these observations,
we compare strategies by nodes.
Hub The equilibrium constructions of Section 3.2 suggest a number of strategies of the
hub that can result in this player obtaining disproportionately large payo¤s. We focus
on identifying one such strategy. Akin to Observation 1, non-switching behavior refers to
the case in which a subject with the role of a hub chooses his initial message constantly
throughout the entire game (including the underlying game); any other observed behavior
is referred to as switching behavior. Table 5A presents the frequencies of non-switching and
switching behaviors in the star and kite networks, together with the frequency of the hub
initially choosing his own favorite message conditional on each category (in parentheses).
- Table 5A about here -
Table 5B shows how reluctant the hub is to switch from his initial message when he
nds himself in conict with every other player in t = 1, together with the number of
observations (in parentheses).
- Table 5B about here -
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These two tables report a marked di¤erence in the hubs behavior across the star and
kite networks. First, the hub in the star network exhibits a strong tendency to insist his
initial message (even after complete disagreement) throughout the game both when T = 2
and when T = 5, while the hub in the kite network shows such tendency only when T = 2.
Second, conditional on non-switching, the hub in the star network chooses his own favorite
message/action with a signicantly larger frequency when T = 2 than when T = 5, while
the corresponding frequencies in the kite network are almost the same.
Next, Table 5C presents the distribution of coordinated actions in the underlying game,
conditional on the hubs behavior.
- Table 5C about here -
There are a couple of notable patterns here. First, in both time treatments for the
star network, coordination occurs mostly when the hub does not switch from his initial
message: 0:96 (= 49=51) when T = 2 and 0:93 (= 54=58) when T = 5. A similar pattern is
established in the kite network with T = 2: 0:89 (= 40=45). However, in the kite network
with T = 5, coordination is more likely to occur when the hub switches from his initial
message: 0:66 (= 45=68). Second, when coordination occurs with non-switching behavior,
it mostly falls on action e, the hubs favorite action. This holds even true in the kite
network with T = 5. When coordination results from switching, however, the distribution
of coordinated actions is not concentrated on action e. In particular, in the kite network
with T = 5, coordination appears to be slightly more likely to occur on action w.
Putting these observations together, we can conclude that the positive time e¤ect on
equity in the star and kite networks is driven by di¤erent behaviors across the two networks.
This is summarized below.
Result 4 1. In the star network, the hub displays a strong tendency of non-switching
behavior both when T = 2 and when T = 5. But, conditional on non-switching, the
hub is less likely to choose his own favorite message/action when T = 5 than when
T = 2.
2. In the kite network, the hub displays a strong tendency of non-switching behavior when
T = 2 but the frequency of switching behavior is greater than that of non-swithcing
when T = 5. Both when T = 2 and when T = 5, non-switching behavior is associated
with a high concentration of coordination on action e while switching behavior does
not result in the likelihood of coordination on action e being greater than on other
actions.
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N and S in the kite network Now that we have identied how increasing the length of
communication generates more equitable outcomes in the star and kite networks, it remains
to investigate why the hubs advantage is lower in the kite than in the star network for
each T . Since the only structural di¤erence between the two networks is the additional
link between players N and S in the kite network, behavior of these players should hold
key to answering this question. But, in order to address these two players, we must rst
consider how other nodes behave in the two networks.
Table 6 below presents the behavior of peripheries in the star, kite and line networks.
Since information about past play of the game ows to a periphery only through the hub
that he is linked to, it is natural to examine a peripherys willingness to conform to the
hub. For this purpose, we divide the relevant histories of observations at the beginning
of each period t  T + 1 (including the action stage) into whether or not a peripherys
message in the previous period coincided with the message chosen by the hub.
- Table 6 about here -
The following patterns are observed in all treatments. Not surprisingly, at a history
in which the periphery and hub chose a common message (the bottom panel of Table
6) the periphery continues to choose the same message almost surely. At other histories
with disagreements, the peripherys tendency to copy the hubs previous message increases
signicantly in period t = T of the entire game. Also, for a given network, this probability
is higher at the end of the game with T = 5 than with T = 2. The probability of conformity,
i.e. following the hubs message when their messages conicted in the previous period, at
the action stage is high in both star and kite: 0:65 (star) and 0:64 (kite) when T = 2; 0:70
(star) and 0:79 (kite) when T = 5.14
Let us now compare these observations with the behavior of N and S in the kite
network. We examine the histories at which either of the two players is in disagreement
with the hub, E. Since N and S can observe each others past messages, the relevant
histories at the beginning of t  T + 1 are partitioned into the following three sets about
the three playersmessages in t  1: (i) N and S played the same message di¤erent from
Es message; (ii) all three players played distinct messages; and (iii) either N or S played
the same message as E. Table 7 presents the behavior of players N and S in the kite
network at these histories.
- Table 7 about here -
14The corresponding probabilities for the line network are somewhat smaller. This may explain the
relatively low coordination rates in the treatments with line network. See Section 6.4 below for further
discussion on the behavior in the line network.
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The di¤erence in behavior between these two players and a periphery is most clearly
seen by the decisions made by N and S contingent on the rst type of histories. Here, in
both time treatments, the two players are much more likely to stick with their own previous
message than to conform with the hub. In this case, the probability that either N or S
switches to the hubs message when playing the underlying game is just 0:29 when T = 2
and 0:28 when T = 5. Even when all three players played di¤erently, the probability of
conformity is signicantly lower when T = 5 (equal to 0.54), compared to the corresponding
tendency exhibited by the periphery, W , in the same treatment (equal to 0.79) as seen in
the previous table. But, when one of N and S agreed with E in the previous period, the
other player is likely to conform to E. Together with the high tendency of conformity by
the peripheries in the star and kite networks (Table 6), these observations (Table 7) lead
to the following result.
Result 5 Both when T = 2 and when T = 5, players N and S in the kite network are less
likely to conform to the hub than the peripheries in the star and kite networks.
We have already seen that, when T = 2, the hub in both star and kite networks exhibits
non-switching behavior (Result 4) and also such behavior is very frequently accompanied by
the hubs own favorite message/action (Table 5A). Thus, Result 5 gives an explanation for
why under this time treatment the distribution of coordinated outcomes is less asymmetric
in the kite network than in the star network. Furthermore, Result 5 suggests that the less
conforming behavior of N and S is what induces the hub in the kite network to switch
his messages much more frequently when T = 5, which in turn reduces the hubs payo¤
advantage.
6.4 Behavior in the complete and line networks
Another interesting feature of Result 2 in Section 6.1 is the symmetry of coordinated
outcomes in the complete and line networks. On the one hand, the observations in the
complete network support the symmetric equilibrium as a useful framework to approach
our games that are fraught with multiple equilibria; on the other hand, one wonders why
in the line network the two hubs, E and W , do not enjoy greater benets than the two
peripheries, N and S. In this section, we engage in a more detailed examination of the
subjectsbehavior in these two networks.
Table 8 presents the frequency of each message played by each subject in the rst period
of communication, together with the frequency of each action in the no communication
treatment.
- Table 8 about here -
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In all reported treatments, all four players appear to randomize over the entire message
set, each attaching the greatest weight on his own favorite message. As expected, the fre-
quency of playing ones own favorite message is higher in treatments with communication
than the treatment without communication. Interestingly, however, there appears to be no
signicant di¤erence in the reported frequencies across the complete and line networks un-
der both time treatments. In particular, for each corresponding treatment, the frequencies
of playing messages other than ones own favorite are fairly evenly distributed.
We next examine what the communication evolves into. Specically, we consider the
distribution of messages in the last period of the communication stage conditional on an
agreement (i.e. unanimity or super-majority) having been reached.15
- Table 9 about here -
The reported distributions are all fairly close to be uniform. Given the observations of
Table 8, this indicates that the subjects behave symmetrically not just in the rst period
but throughout the communication stage. This gives our nal result.
Result 6 Both when T = 2 and when T = 5, there is evidence indicating that all four
players in the complete and line networks behave symmetrically.
7 Conclusion
We have explored the role of network structure and length of pre-play communication in
a coordination game with conicting preferences, which can be naturally interpreted as an
extension of Battle of the Sexes. By introducing network variations, we have been able to
address not only the issue of e¢ ciency, which has been the focus of standard cheap-talk
literature, but also the issue of equity. Our main conclusion is that network structure
has important implications on behavior and outcome, and on both issues of e¢ ciency and
equity. In particular, we have identied how certain network structures break the symmetry
of players in the underlying game and confer strategic edge, and hence higher payo¤, to
some players. Nonetheless, the extent of such strategic advantage depends on the length of
communication. When communication lasts longer, this advantage becomes weaker, which
in turn makes coordination outcomes more equitable.
In this paper, we have chosen one particular underlying game to investigate the role
of network structure of pre-play communication. Our approach can be applied to study
di¤erent games, for instance, other coordination games such as ones with Pareto-ranked
equilibria. Cooper, De Jong, Forsythe and Ross (1989, 1992) provide experimental evidence
15Super-majority in the line network includes both E and W .
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that one-way communication is more e¤ective in Battle of the Sexes, whereas two-way com-
munication is more e¤ective in Stag Hunt. Their ndings with two-player games suggest
that network structure of pre-play communication generate di¤erent implications in di¤er-
ent coordination games. Extending our analysis to other classes of underlying game may
also call for an even richer set of network variations, for instance, including directed, as
well as undirected, graphs. Another potentially interesting extension is to consider cheap
talk games with incomplete information (pioneered by Crawford and Sobel (1982)). We
shall leave these issues for future research.
References
[1] Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart (2003), Long Cheap Talk,Econometrica, 71, 1619-1660.
[2] Burton, A., G. Loomes and M. Sefton (2005), Communication and E¢ ciency in Co-
ordination Game Experiments,in Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Advances
in Applied Microeconomics, vol. 13, ed. J. Morgan, 63-85. JAI Press.
[3] Calvó-Armengol, A. and J. de Martí (2007), Communication Networks: Knowledge
and Decision,American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 97, 86-91.
[4] Calvó-Armengol, A. and J. de Martí (2009), Information Gathering in Organizations:
Equilibrium, Welfare and Optimal Network Structure,Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, 7, 116-161.
[5] Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interactions.
Princeton University Press.
[6] Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Amer-
ican Industrial Enterprise. MIT Press.
[7] Choi, S., D. Gale, S. Kariv and T. Palfrey (2009), Network Architecture, Salience
and Coordination,mimeo.
[8] Chwe, M. (2000), Communication and Coordination in Social Networks, Review of
Economic Studies, 67, 1-16.
[9] Cooper, R. W., D. V. De Jong, R. Forsythe and T. W. Ross (1989), Communication
in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results, Rand Journal of
Economics, 20, 568-587.
[10] Cooper, R. W., D. V. De Jong, R. Forsythe and T. W. Ross (1992), Communication
in Coordination Games,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 739-771.
23
[11] Crawford, V. (1998), A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk,
Journal of Economic Theory, 78, 286-298.
[12] Crawford, V. (2007), Lets Talk It Over: Coordination via Pre-play Communication
with Level-k Thinking,mimeo.
[13] Crawford, V. and J. Sobel (1982), Strategic Information Transmission,Economet-
rica, 50, 579-594.
[14] Farrell, J. (1987), Cheap Talk, Coordination and Entry,Rand Journal of Economics,
18, 34-39.
[15] Fischbacher, U. (2007), z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experi-
ments,Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178.
[16] Freeman, L. C. (1977), A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness,
Sociometry, 40, 35-41.
[17] Galeotti, A., C. Ghiglino and F. Squintani (2009), Strategic Information Transmis-
sion in Networks,mimeo.
[18] Goyal, S. (2007). Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks. Prince-
ton University Press.
[19] Hagenbach, J. and F. Koessler (2009), Strategic Communication Networks, forth-
coming in Review of Economic Studies.
[20] Jackson, M. O. (2008). Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press.
[21] Kearns, M., S. Judd, J. Tan and J. Wortman (2009), Behavioral Experiments on
Biased Voting in Networks,Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106,
1347-1352.
[22] Kosfeld, M. (2004), Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey,Review of
Network Economics, 3, 20-41.
[23] Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Pren-
tice Hall.
[24] Rabin, M. (1994), A Model of Pre-Game Communication, Journal of Economic
Theory, 63, 370-391.
[25] Wasserman, S. and K. Faust (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applica-
tions. Cambridge University Press.
24
Appendix I - Equilibrium Constructions
1. Complete network
Symmetric equilibria with alternative denitions of agreement Consider the
following strategy prole:
 t = 1
Each player I 2 fN;E; S;Wg plays each message j 2 fn; e; s; wg, j 6= i, with
probability q1 and message i with probability 1  3q1;
 t = 2; : : : ; T
If there was an agreementin t  1 (we dene an agreementbelow), each I plays
the corresponding message with probability 1; otherwise, I plays each message j 6= i
with probability qt and message i with probability 1  3qt;
 t = T + 1 (underlying game)
If there was an agreementin T , each I plays the corresponding action with prob-
ability 1; otherwise, I plays action i with probability k2
3k1+k2
and each j 6= i with
probability k1
3k1+k2
.16
An agreement in period t takes one of three forms - (i) unanimity; (ii) unanimity
and super-majority; or (iii) unanimity, super-majority and majority (each of these terms
are dened in the main text above). We next describe a recursive process that gives the
equilibrium mixing probabilities qt under each agreement form. For t = 1; : : : ; T + 1, let
ut denote the equilibrium continuation payo¤ to each player at the beginning of period t,
conditional on no agreement having been reached.
(i) Unanimity
For each t = 1; : : : ; T , the following indi¤erence condition characterizes the equilib-
rium:
ut = q
3
t k2 + (1  q3t )ut+1 = q2t (1  3qt)k1 + [1  q2t (1  3qt)]ut+1:
Letting k1 = 1 and k2 = 3 as in the experiments, we obtain a recursive equation
16Any observed deviation during the communication stage is punished by continuation play of the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of the underlying game in which each player I plays action i for sure.
25
system
qt =
1  ut+1
6  4ut+1
ut = 3q
3
t + (1  q3t )ut+1
uT+1 =
1
72
:
Let the probability of agreement/coordination at t be denoted by t. We have t =
4q3t (1  3qt). The probability of coordination is then equal to
1 + (1  1)2 +   +
TY
t=1
(1  t)T+1: (1)
(ii) Super-majority
Fix any t  T , and suppose that there was no agreement in t  1. Given symmetry,
without loss of generality, consider player N playing message n and any other mes-
sage, say, e. For each case, we summarize all possible events and their likelihoods,
together with the corresponding continuation payo¤s:
 N chooses n.
outcome likelihood continuation payo¤
unanimity (on n) q3t 3
super-majority on n 3 (q2t   q3t ) 3
super-majority not on n 3(1  3qt)q2t 1
disagreement 1  q2t (6  11qt) ut+1
 N chooses e.
outcome likelihood continuation payo¤
unanimity (on e) q2t (1  3qt) 1
super-majority on n q3t 3
super-majority on e 2qt(1  3qt)(1  qt) + 3q3t 1
super-majority on w or s 2(1  3qt)q2t 1
disagreement 1  2qt + 5q2t   q3t ut+1
This sets up the indi¤erence equation and a recursive system, similarly to the una-
nimity case above. We can also compute the probability of agreement at t  T to be
4 [(1  3qt)(3q2t   2q3t ) + 3q4t ] (the corresponding probability for T + 1 is 1108).
(iii) Majority
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Fix any t  T , and suppose that there was no agreement in t  1. Given symmetry,
consider player N playing message n or any other message, say, e. For each case, we
summarize all possible events and their likelihoods, together with the corresponding
continuation payo¤s:
 N chooses n.
outcome likelihood continuation payo¤
unanimity (on n) q3t 3
super-majority on n 3 (q2t   q3t ) 3
super-majority not on n 3(1  3qt)q2t 1
majority on n 9q3t + 6q
2
t (1  3qt) + 3qt(1  3qt)2 3
majority not on n 6 [q3t + q
2
t (1  3qt) + qt(1  3qt)2] 1
disagreement 1  9qt + 36q2t   49q3t ut+1
 N chooses e.
outcome likelihood continuation payo¤
unanimity (on e) q2t (1  3qt) 1
super-majority on n q3t 3
super-majority on e 2qt(1  3qt)(1  qt) + 3q3t 1
super-majority on w or s 2(1  3qt)q2t 1
majority on n 2q2t (1  qt) 3
majority on e 1  7qt + 22q2t   22q3t 1
majority on w or s 2qt(1  3qt + 2q2t ) 1
disagreement 3qt   13q2t + 19q3t ut+1
This sets up the indi¤erence equation and a recursive system. We can also compute
the probability of agreement at t  T to be 4qt (3  18qt + 49q2t   51q3t ).
In the following table, we report some key features of the symmetric equilibrium above,
for di¤erent denitions of an agreement and communication lengths. Given the payo¤s
used the experimental design (k1 = 1 and k2 = 3), we simulate for each game (i) the
probability of coordination in the underlying game (as in (1) above and its counterparts
in equilibria with other agreement forms) and (ii) the probability with which each player
announces his favorite message/action in the rst period of communication. In the table
below, each row gives these probabilities calculated from the three equilibria for the game
with pre-communication length T .
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Unanimity Super-majority Majority
T Coord prob Mix prob Coord prob Mix prob Coord prob Mix prob
1 0:018 0:502 0:133 0:589 0:576 0:774
2 0:027 0:505 0:228 0:627 0:663 0:942
3 0:036 0:507 0:302 0:662 0:667 0:997
4 0:045 0:509 0:359 0:694 0:667 0:999
5 0:053 0:512 0:404 0:723 0:667 1:000
A symmetric equilibrium with partial/interim agreements Suppose that T = 2.
As in the experiments, k1 = 1 and k2 = 3. We establish the following symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium:
 t = 1
Each player I 2 fN;E; S;Wg plays each j 2 fn; e; s; wg, j 6= i, with probability q
and i with probability 1  3q.
 t = 2
(1) If there was super-majority or unanimity in t = 1, each I plays the corresponding
message with probability 1.
(2) If there was majority and message i was played in t = 1, each I plays message
i with probability 1  2x and each of the other two previously played messages
with probability x.
(3) If there was majority and message i was not played in t = 1, each I plays each
of the three previously played messages with probability 1
3
.
(4) If there was tied-majority and message i was played in t = 1, each I plays
message i with probability 1  y and the other previously played message with
probability y.
(5) If there was tied-majority and message i was not played in t = 1, each I plays
each of the two previously played messages with equal probability;
(6) if there was complete disagreement in t = 1, each I plays message i with prob-
ability 1  3z and each of the other three messages with probability z.
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 underlying game
If there was super-majority or unanimity in t = 2, each I plays the correspond-
ing pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; otherwise, each I plays the symmetric mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium (yielding each player a payo¤ of 1
72
).17
In order to establish this equilibrium, let us rst go through each continuation game at
t = 2 (numbered as above). We compute the mixing probabilities and continuation payo¤s
that support subgame perfectness.
(1) The specied continuation strategies are clearly optimal.
(2) Given symmetry, without loss of generality, consider player N and suppose that the
messages played in the previous period are n, e and s. Let ux refer to the players
expected continuation payo¤ in this case.
If he chooses message n, his expected payo¤ amounts to
ux = 3 x
2
3|{z}
unanimity on n
+3 2x
3|{z}
super-majority on n
+
2x(1  2x)
3| {z }
super-majority on e or s
+
1
72


1  4x
3
+ x2

| {z }
otherwise
If he chooses e, the expected payo¤ is
ux =
x (1  2x)
3| {z }
unanimity on e
+3 x
2
3|{z}
super-majority on n
+
1  x
3| {z }
super-majority on e
+
x(1  2x)
3| {z }
super-majority on s
+
1
72


2
3
  x
3
+ x2

| {z }
otherwise
:
Thus, we obtain x = 0:141717 and ux = 0:38276.
(3) Consider player N , and suppose that the messages played in the previous period are
e, s and w. Let u0x refer to the expected continuation payo¤ in this case.
If he chooses e, then we have
u0x = x
2(1  2x)| {z }
unanimity on e
+2

x (1  2x) (1  x) + x3| {z }
super-majority on e
+ 2x2 (1  2x)| {z }
super-majority on s or w
+
1
72
 1  2x+ 3x2| {z }
otherwise
:
Substituting for x calculated above, we obtain that u0x = 0:23397.
(4) Consider player N , and suppose that the messages played in the previous period are
n and e. Let uy refer to the expected continuation payo¤ in this case.
17Any observed deviation in period 2 is punished by continuation play of the pure strategy NE of the
underlying game in which each player plays his favorite action for sure.
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If he chooses message n, we have
uy = 3 y
4|{z}
unanimity on n
+ 3

y
2
+
1  y
4

| {z }
super-majority on n
+
1  y
4| {z }
super-majority on e
+
1
72
 2  y
4| {z }
otherwise
(2)
If he chooses e, the expected payo¤ is
uy =
1  y
4| {z }
unanimity on e
+ 3 y
4|{z}
super-majority on n
+

1  y
2
+
y
4

| {z }
super-majority on e
+
1
72
 1 + y
4| {z }
otherwise
(3)
However, (2) can be rewritten as 145
144
+ 359
288
y, which is strictly larger than 1 for any
y 2 [0; 1]. Thus, we obtain that y = 0 and uy = 1:00694:
(5) Consider player N , and suppose that the messages played in the previous period are
e and w. Let u0y refer to the expected continuation payo¤ in this case.
If he chooses e, then
u0y =
y (1  y)
2| {z }
unanimity on e
+
1  y + y2
2| {z }
super-majority on e
+
y(1  y)
2| {z }
super-majority on w
+
1
72
 1  y + y
2
2| {z }
otherwise
:
Given y = 0, we obtain u0y = 0:50694.
(6) Consider player N . Let u0z refer to the expected continuation payo¤ in this case.
If he chooses message, then
uz = 3z
3 + 9(z2   z3) + 3z2(1  3z) + 1
72

1  z2(6  11z)
If he chooses any of the other messages, say e, then
uz = z
2(1 3z)+3z3+2z2(1  3z) + 2z(1  z)(1  3z) + 3z3+ 1
72

1  z(2  5z + z2)) :
We therefore obtain z = 0:13691 and uz = 0:19915.
Next, let us consider each players incentives in t = 1, given the continuation payo¤s
computed above. First, suppose that player N plays message n. We summarize all the
possible events and their likelihoods in t = 1 as well as the corresponding continuation
payo¤s in the rst of two tables below. Second, suppose that player N plays any other
action, say, e. The second table below summarizes all the possible events, their likelihoods
and continuation payo¤s.
A simulation exercise from these gures demonstrates that there exists a unique q 2 
0; 1
3

that solves the indi¤erence condition and it amounts to q = 0:122713. The equilib-
rium payo¤ to each player is 0:495797.
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N chooses n.
outcome in t = 1 likelihood continuation payo¤
unanimity (on n) q3 3
super-majority on n 3(q2   q3) 3
super-majority not on n 3q2(1  3q) 1
majority on n 9q3 + 6q2(1  3q) + 3q(1  3q)2 ux
majority on e 2q3 + 2q2(1  3q) + 2q(1  3q)2 ux
majority on s 2q3 + 2q2(1  3q) + 2q(1  3q)2 ux
majority on w 2q3 + 2q2(1  3q) + 2q(1  3q)2 ux
tied-majority (on n) 3[q3 + 2q2(1  3q)] uy
complete disagreement 2q3 + 3q2(1  3q) + (1  3q)3 uz
N chooses e.
outcome in t = 1 likelihood continuation payo¤
unanimity (on e) q2(1  3q) 1
super-majority on n q3 3
super-majority on e 3q3 + 4q2(1  3q) + 2q(1  3q)2 1
super-majority on s q2(1  3q) 1
super-majority on w q2(1  3q) 1
majority on n 2q2(1  q) ux
majority on e and n played by no-one 2q3 + 3q2(1  3q) + (1  3q)3 u0x
majority on e but n played by someone 2q(1  2q)2 + 4q3 ux
majority on s and n played by no-one q(1  3q)2 + q2(1  3q) + q3 u0x
majority on s but n played by someone q3 + 2q2(1  3q) ux
majority on w and n played by no-one q(1  3q)2 + q2(1  3q) + q3 u0x
majority on w but n played by someone q3 + 2q2(1  3q) ux
tied-majority, not including n 2q3 + 2q2(1  3q) + 2q(1  3q)2 uy
tied-majority, including n 2q3 + q2(1  3q) u0y
complete disagreement 3q3 + q(1  3q)(1  q) uz
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2. Incomplete networks
Star and kite networks The following construction is for the star network. It is
straightforward to extend it to the kite network. Also, without loss of generality, suppose
that T = 3. Consider the following strategies. Beliefs are Bayesian whenever possible.
 t = 1
The hub, player E, mixes among the four messages with arbitrary probabilities.
Each J 6= E plays message j with probability p, each k 6= j; e with probability q and
message e with probability r (such that p+ 2q + r = 1).
 t = 2 and t = 3
If in t = 1 the other three players all played the same message (an agreement)
then, in both t = 2 and t = 3, E announces that message; otherwise, E announces
two (arbitrary) di¤erent messages in t = 2 and t = 3. Each J 6= E makes arbitrary
announcements in t = 2 and t = 3.
 underlying game
 If there was an agreement in t = 1 and he played as above in t = 2; 3, E plays
the corresponding action with probability 1; if there was no agreement in t = 1
but he deviated from above by playing the same message, i, in t = 2; 3, E plays
every j 6= i each with probability 1
3
; otherwise, E plays e with probability 1.
 If E announced the same message, i, in t = 2; 3 and he himself played i in t = 1,
each J 6= E plays i with probability 1;
If E announced the same message, i, in t = 2; 3 but he himself did not play i in
t = 1 and i 6= j, each J 6= E plays j with probability 1;
If E announced the same message, i, in t = 2; 3 but he himself did not play i in
t = 1 and i = j, each J 6= E plays e with probability 1;
Otherwise, each J 6= E plays j with probability 1.
To establish that the strategies constitute an equilibrium, note rst that, in equilibrium,
the indi¤erence condition of each J 6= E is given by
k2q
2 = k1pq = k1r
2
where the rst term is the expected payo¤ from playing own favorite message, the second
is the expected payo¤ from playing one of two other messages except for e and the nal
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is the expected payo¤ from playing message e. It is straightforward to solve for the three
probabilities:
p =
k2
2k1 +
p
k1k2 + k2
; q =
k1
2k1 +
p
k1k2 + k2
; r =
p
k1k2
2k1 +
p
k1k2 + k2
:
Since k2 > k1, this implies that p > r > q. Moreover, the probability of coordination
on e (which is equal to r3) is greater than that on any other action (equal to pq2). It
is straightforward to check that deviations are not protable for E under any o¤-the-
equilibrium beliefs.
Line network Slight modication to the strategies constructed for the star (kite) net-
work above will deliver an analogous equilibrium for the line network. Consider the fol-
lowing strategies. Beliefs are Bayesian whenever possible.
 t = 1
Players E and W , mix among the four messages with arbitrary probabilities. Each
J 2 fN;Sg plays message j with probability p, each of e and w with probability q
and the remaining message with probability r (such that p+ 2q + r = 1).
 t = 2
Player E (W ) plays the message played by N (S) in t = 1. Players N and S play
arbitrarily.
 t = 3
Player E (W ) plays the message that he played in t = 2 if W (E) played the same
message in t = 2; otherwise, he plays a di¤erent message. Players N and S play
arbitrarily.
 underlying game
 If both he and playerW (E) played the same message in t = 2 and t = 3 and that
message was played by N (S) in t = 1, player E (W ) plays the corresponding
action for sure;
If both he and player W (E) played the same message in t = 2 and t = 3 but
that message was not played by N (S) in t = 1, E (W ) plays the message of N
(S) in t = 1 for sure;
Otherwise, he plays e (w) for sure.
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 If E (W ) plays the same message in t = 2 and t = 3 and that message is the
message that he himself played in t = 1, N (S) plays the corresponding action
for sure;
If E (W ) plays the same message in t = 2 and t = 3 but that message is not
what he himself played in t = 1, N (S) plays an action that corresponds to
neither his message in t = 1 nor the message of E (W ) in t = 2; 3 for sure;
Otherwise, he plays n (s) for sure.
To compute equilibrium mixing probabilities at t = 1, consider N . His indi¤erence
condition is:
k2r = k1q = k1p;
which implies that p = q = 3
10
and r = 1
10
. Clearly, the probability of coordination on
action e or w is higher than that on n or s.
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Appendix II 
Sample instructions: kite network with T = 2 
 
Instructions 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. A research foundation has 
provided funds for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your decisions 
and partly on the decisions of the other participants in the experiments. If you follow the 
instructions and make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money.  
At this point, check the name of the computer you are using as it appears on the top of the 
monitor. At the end of the experiment, you should use your computer name to claim your 
earnings. At this time, you will receive £5 as a participation fee (simply for showing up on time). 
Details of how you will make decisions will be provided below. 
During the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of pounds. 
Your earnings will be calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged at the end of the 
experiment into pounds at the following rate: 
2 Tokens = 1 Pound 
In this experiment, you will participate in 20 independent and identical (of the same form) 
rounds, each divided into two stages: a communication stage, which consists of 2 decision-turns, 
and an action stage, which consists of a single decision-turn. In each round you will be assigned 
to a position in a four-person network. In each decision-turn of a communication stage, you will 
be able to communicate with the other participants to whom you are connected in the network. 
That is, you will be able to send a message to the connected participants and receive messages 
from them.  
Before the first round, you will be randomly assigned to one of the four network positions 
labeled N, W, S, or E. One fourth of the participants in the room will be designated as type-N 
participants, one fourth as type-W participants, one fourth as type-S participants and one fourth as 
type-E participants. Your type (N, W, S, or E) depends solely upon chance and will remain 
constant in all rounds throughout the experiment.  
When you are asked to send your first message, the network and your type will be displayed 
at the top left hand side of the screen (see Attachment 1). It is also illustrated in the diagram 
below. A line segment between any two types indicates that the two types are connected and that 
they can communicate with each other: each can send a message to the other and receive a 
message from the other. 
                                                               N 
 
                                            W                                   E 
 
                                                               S 
Note that in the network used in this experiment, type-E participants can communicate with all 
the other types (N, W, and S) and type-W participants can communicate only with type-E, while 
type-N participants can communicate with type-E and type-S, and type-S participants can 
communicate with type-E and type-N. 
 
A decision round 
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 20 rounds. Each round 
starts by having the computer randomly form four-person groups by selecting one participant of 
type-N, one of type-W, one of type-S and one of type-E, per group.  
The groups formed in each round depend solely upon chance and are independent of the 
groups formed in any of the other rounds. That is, in any group each participant of type-N is 
equally likely to be chosen for that group, and similarly with participants of type-W, type-S and 
type-E. Groups are formed by the computer. 
Each round in a group consists of two stages: first, communication stage, and second, action 
stage. Your final earnings will depend only on what you choose and what others in your group 
choose in the action stage. Four actions, n, w, s and e, are available in the action stage. The 
communication stage that precedes the action stage involves each participant sending messages. 
Four messages are available in the communication stage, and they shall be labeled by the same 
letters, n, w, s and e, as the actions available in the action stage. A message may indicate your 
intended action in the subsequent action stage. However, you do not have to follow your message 
when it comes to making an action choice. We now describe each of these two stages in more 
detail. 
A communication stage 
The communication stage itself consists of two decision-turns. At the beginning of the first 
decision-turn, you will be asked to choose a message – n, w, s or e. You will see four boxes, each 
labeled with a possible message, at the bottom left hand side of the screen. When you are ready to 
make your decision, simply use the mouse to click on one of them. You will then see a small 
pop-up window asking you to confirm your decision (see Attachment 2). 
Once everyone in your group has confirmed a decision, type-E participant in your group will 
receive the messages chosen by all the other types (type-N, type-W, and type-S) and type-W 
participant in your group will receive only the message chosen by type-E, while type-N 
participant in your group will receive the messages chosen by type-E and type-S, and type-S 
participants in your group will receive the messages chosen by type-E and type-N. For example, 
if you are type-N participant, you will be informed of which message each of type-E and type-S 
participants has chosen. This information is displayed at the middle right hand side of the screen 
(see Attachment 1). This completes the first of five decision-turns in the communication stage of 
this round.  
This process will be repeated in the second decision-turn of the communication stage. Note 
again that when everyone in your group has made a decision in each decision-turn, your chosen 
message will be sent to each type participant in your group to whom you are connected. Likewise, 
you will receive the messages chosen by all the other type participants to whom you are 
connected. 
An action stage 
When the communication stage ends, each participant in your group will be asked to choose 
one action out of the four possible actions, n, w, s, or e, without knowing the action selected by 
each other. You will see four boxes, each labeled with a possible action, at the bottom left hand 
side of the screen (see Attachment 3). When you are ready to make your decision, simply use the 
mouse to click on one of them. This will end the action stage. When the action stage ends, the 
computer will inform everyone the choices of actions made by all the participants in your group 
and the earnings (see Attachment 4).  
After you observe the results of the first round, the second round will start the computer 
randomly forming new groups of four participants. The process will be repeated until all the 20 
independent and identical rounds are completed. At the end of the last round, you will be 
informed the experiment has ended.  
Earnings 
Your earnings in each round are determined solely by the action you choose and the actions 
the other participants in your group choose in the action stage. The messages you and other type 
participants have chosen in the preceding communication stage are irrelevant to earnings. 
 If all the participants in your group choose action n, type-N participant in your group 
will receive 3 tokens and each of the other types (type-W, type-S, and type-E) in your 
group will receive 1 token.  
 If all the participants in your group choose action w, type-W participant in your group 
will receive 3 tokens and each of the other types (type-N, type-S, and type-E) in your 
group will receive 1 token. 
 If all the participants in your group choose action s, type-S participant in your group 
will receive 3 tokens and each of the other types (type-N, type-W, and type-E) in your 
group will receive 1 token.  
 If all the participants in your group choose action e, type-E participant in your group 
will receive 3 tokens and each of the other types (type-N, type-W, and type-S) in your 
group will receive 1 token.  
 Otherwise, that is, if all the participants in your group do not choose a common action, 
every participant in your group will receive 0 token.  
For example, if type-S participant chooses action s and all the other types choose action n, 
every participant will receive 0 token. This information on earnings is displayed at the top right 
hand side of the screens in both the communication stage and action stage (see Attachment 1 and 
3).  
Your final earnings in the experiment will be the sum of your earnings over the 20 rounds. 
At the end of the experiment, the tokens will be converted into money. You will receive your 
payment as you leave the experiment. 
 
Rules 
Please do not talk with anyone during the experiment. We ask everyone to remain silent until 
the end of the last round. 
Your participation in the experiment and any information about your earnings will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your payments receipt is the only place in which your name is recorded. 
If there are no further questions, you are ready to start. An instructor will activate your 
program. 
Attachment 1 
 
Attachment 2 
 
Attachment 3 
 
Attachment 4 
 
Network T
2
5
2
5
2
5
2
5
2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5
2 -- 0.48 0.87 0.31 0.26 0.67 0.00 0.06 0.00
5 -- -- 0.37 0.71 0.06 0.76 0.00 0.01 0.00
2 -- -- -- 0.24 0.33 0.55 0.00 0.08 0.00
5 -- -- -- -- 0.03 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 -- -- -- -- -- 0.11 0.00 0.43 0.00
5 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.01 0.00
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.01 0.00
5 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
80
100
0.64 80
0.73 80
Complete Star
Table 1. Frequencies of coordination
0.56 80
0.68 100
Complete
Star
Kite
0.28 80
Coord. freq. # of obs
0.65
0.70
No communication
No com-
munication
Notes: Each cell reports the p -value from nonparametric test on coordination rates between two treatments. A darker-shaded cell 
represents a pair-wise nonparametric test between T=2 and T=5 within a network; a lighter-shaded cell represents a pair-wise 
nonparametric test between two networks given T. 
Chi-square nonparametric tests on coordination rates
0.50 80
No communication 0.05 150
Kite Line
Line
Complete
Star
Kite
Line
Network T n e s w # of obs. (p-value)
2 0.19 0.33 0.23 0.25 52 (0.25)
5 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.24 70 (0.96)
2 0.10 0.76 0.06 0.08 51 (0.00)
5 0.19 0.45 0.19 0.17 58 (0.00)
2 0.18 0.56 0.16 0.11 45 (0.00)
5 0.16 0.34 0.21 0.29 68 (0.05)
2 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.27 22 (0.49)
5 0.23 0.30 0.18 0.30 40 (0.25)
No communication -- 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 8 (0.00)
Line
Note: A p-value is from the chi-square nonparametric test with null hypothesis that the action frequencies are uniformly distributed. 
Table 2. Frequencies of coordinated actions
Action
Complete
Star
Kite
Coord. freq. # of obs. Coord. freq. # of obs.
0.95 22 0.95 41
0.73 33 0.62 47
0.47 15 0.13 8
0.00 8 0.00 2
0.00 2 0.50 2
0.65 80 0.70 100
Coord. freq. # of obs. Coord. freq. # of obs.
Unanimity 0.95 20 0.88 25
NES/ NEW/ ESW 0.66 32 0.86 35
NSW 0.00 2 0.00 1
NE/ EW/ ES 0.40 20 0.38 13
NS/ NW/ SW 1.00 1 0.00 2
Others 0.40 5 0.25 4
0.64 80 0.73 80
Coord. freq. # of obs. Coord. freq. # of obs.
Unanimity 0.89 9 1.00 33
NES/ NEW/ ESW 0.89 28 0.74 38
NSW -- 0 0.00 1
NE/ EW/ ES 0.50 18 0.33 15
NS/ NW/ SW 0.00 9 0.00 3
Others 0.19 16 0.10 10
0.56 80 0.68 100
Coord. freq. # of obs. Coord. freq. # of obs.
Unanimity 1.00 11 1.00 24
NEW/ ESW 0.35 20 0.64 22
NSW/ NES 0.33 6 0.00 2
EW 0.50 4 0.00 2
NW/ ES/ NE/ SW 0.00 22 0.00 10
NS 0.00 3 0.50 2
Others 0.00 14 0.06 18
0.28 80 0.50 80
Total
Table 3. Relation between last-period communication and coordination
T = 2 T = 5
Outcome
Unanimity
Super-majority
Majority
Tied-majority
Complete disagreement
Table 3A. Complete
Total
Super-majority
Majority
Total
Super-majority
Majority
Total
Outcome
Outcome
Super-majority
Majority
T = 2 T = 5
T = 5
Outcome
T = 2 T = 5
T = 2Table 3B. Star
Table 3C. Kite
Table 3D. Line
Network T 1 2 3 4 5 Coord. freq.
0.15 0.69
(--) (0.54)
0.09 0.42 0.61 0.73 0.88
(--) (0.33) (0.19) (0.12) (0.15)
0.29 0.65
(--) (0.36)
0.13 0.36 0.51 0.60 0.75
(--) (0.24) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15)
0.08 0.46
(--) (0.38)
0.05 0.16 0.26 0.41 0.71
(--) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.30)
0.05 0.39
(--) (0.34)
0.04 0.15 0.25 0.39 0.58
(--) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.19)
Notes: (1) A number in parentheses is  the marginal change from period t-1  to period t . (2) For incomplete networks, we consider 
only super-majority including the hub(s). 
Table 4. Frequencies of unanimity and super-majority
0.65
0.70
0.64
0.73
0.56-- -- --
-- -- --
-- --
0.68
0.282
5 0.50
Line
Time (t )
Complete
Star
Kite
2
5
2
5
2
5
-- -- --
--
Network T non-switching switching Network T Freq.
0.91 0.09 0.81
( 0.78 ) ( 0.57 ) ( 21 )
0.89 0.11 0.87
( 0.54 ) ( 0.44 ) ( 30 )
0.85 0.15 0.69
( 0.72 ) ( 0.75 ) ( 39 )
0.41 0.59 0.36
( 0.73 ) ( 0.68 ) ( 61 )
Network T Switching N E S W Total
No 4 38 3 4 49
Yes 1 1 0 0 2
No 10 25 10 9 54
Yes 1 1 1 1 4
No 8 25 4 3 40
Yes 0 0 3 2 5
No 3 16 2 2 23
Yes 8 7 12 18 45
Kite
2
5
Table 5C. Frequencies of coordinated actions conditional on non-switching / switching
Star
2
5
Kite
2
5
Table 5B. Frequencies of non-switching by the 
hub after initial disagreement
Star
2
5
Table 5A. Behavior of the hub
Star
2
5
Kite
2
5
Message in t-1 Network T 2 3 4 5 6
2 0.50 (157) 0.65 (91) -- -- --
5 0.27 (180) 0.16 (140) 0.15 (121) 0.32 (107) 0.70 (79)
2 0.18 (67) 0.64 (55) -- -- --
5 0.13 (80) 0.10 (80) 0.11 (72) 0.62(53) 0.79 (24)
2 0.40 (126) 0.44 (75) -- -- --
5 0.18 (141) 0.13 (117) 0.24 (102) 0.44 (77) 0.58 (53)
2 0.99 (83) 0.99 (149) -- -- --
5 1.00 (60) 0.98 (100) 0.99 (119) 1.00 (133) 0.98 (161)
2 1.00 (13) 1.00 (25) -- -- --
5 0.95 (20) 1.00 (20) 1.00 (28) 1.00 (47) 1.00 (76)
2 1.00 (34) 1.00 (85) -- -- --
5 0.89 (19) 0.93 (43) 1.00 (58) 0.99 (83) 1.00 (017)
Time (t)
Table 6. Behavior of the periphery: m I
t  = m H
t-1
Notes: (1) A number in parentheses is the number of observations. (2) I  is a periphery - N/S/W  in star, W  in kite, N/S  in line. H  is the hub that I is linked to -
E  in star and kite, E/W  in line. (3) Message or action of periphery I  (hub H ) in period t  is denoted by m I
t  (m H
t ). (4) The action stage is referred to as  t = 
T+1, T = 2,5.
m I
t-1 ≠  m H
t-1
m I
t-1 =  m H
t-1
Star
Kite
Line
Star
Kite
Line
Message in (t-1) Behavior in t T 2 3 4 5 6
2 0.93 (14) 0.71 (14) -- -- --
5 0.87 (30) 0.96 (24) 0.93 (28) 0.86 (28) 0.72 (18)
2 0.07 (14) 0.29 (14) -- -- --
5 0.03 (30) 0.04 (24) 0.00 (28) 0.14 (28) 0.28 (18)
2 0.65 (84) 0.28 (32) -- -- --
5 0.90 (124) 0.84 (124) 0.82 (94) 0.58 (64) 0.42 (26)
2 0.30 (84) 0.72 (32) -- -- --
5 0.03 (124) 0.09 (124) 0.05 (94) 0.30 (64) 0.54 (26)
2 0.18 (28) 0.03 (30) -- -- --
5 0.55 (22) 0.67 (12) 0.79 (19) 0.63 (24) 0.24 (33)
2 0.79 (28) 0.97 (30) -- -- --
5 0.45 (22) 0.25 (12) 0.16 (19) 0.33 (24) 0.73 (33)
Notes: (1) Player I 's message or action in t  is denoted by m I
t . (2) A number in parentheses is the number of observations.
(I ≠ J  = N or S) Time (t )
Table 7. Behavior of players N  and S  in the kite network
m I
t-1  ≠  m J
t-1  ≠ 
m E
t‐1
m I
t-1  = m J
t-1  ≠ 
m E
t‐1
m I
t = m I
t-1
m I
t  = m E
t-1
m I
t  = m I
t-1
m I
t = m E
t-1
m I
t-1  ≠  m J
t-1  = 
m E
t‐1
m I
t  = m I
t-1
m I
t = m E
t-1
n e s w n e s w
N 0.43 0.19 0.18 0.21 N 0.62 0.19 0.09 0.10
E 0.09 0.75 0.08 0.09 E 0.05 0.85 0.04 0.06
S 0.14 0.10 0.65 0.11 S 0.08 0.09 0.64 0.19
W 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.78 W 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.53
n e s w n e s w
N 0.61 0.16 0.06 0.16 N 0.80 0.06 0.06 0.08
E 0.13 0.60 0.13 0.15 E 0.06 0.65 0.13 0.16
S 0.19 0.14 0.61 0.06 S 0.08 0.06 0.84 0.03
W 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.78 W 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.71
n e s w
N 0.47 0.24 0.19 0.09
E 0.25 0.47 0.20 0.07
S 0.34 0.23 0.33 0.10
W 0.25 0.37 0.13 0.25
Type
No communication Action
Type Type
Line, T = 5Line, T = 2 Message at t = 1
TypeType
Message at t = 1
Table 8. Behavior in the first period: complete, line and no-communication treatments
Complete, T = 2 Message in t = 1 Complete, T = 5 Message in t = 1
n e s w # of obs.
2 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.35 55
5 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.25 88
2 0.20 0.26 0.17 0.37 35
5 0.20 0.27 0.18 0.35 49
Complete
Line
message
Table 9. Frequencies of messages under agreement in the last period of communication
Note: Agreement in the complete network is defined as either unanimity or super-majority; agreement in the line network refers to 
a consensus between E  and W . 
 Complete network 
S
N
E W 
Star network 
S 
N
E W
Kite network 
S 
N
E W 
    Line network 
S 
N
E W
Figure 1. Communication Networks 
Figure 2A Frequencies of Coordinated Actions in the Networks with T = 2 .           
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Figure 2B. Frequencies of Coordinated Actions in the Networks with T = 5
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